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“Cities concentrate poverty, but they also represent the best hope of 
escaping it”, in “Unleashing the Potential of Urban Growth”. 
UN Population Fund (2007). 
 
“Cities have the capability of providing something for everybody, only 
because and only when they are created by everybody”, Jacobs (1984) 
p251. 
 
Introduction 
The city offers the potential of dynamic agglomeration 
economies which can spur the achievement of economic growth. Yet 
the city often appears as a centre of crisis in the early 21st century. 
How are we to reconcile these two, probably valid, but seemingly 
paradoxical, observations? If indeed the city offers such potential for 
dynamism and economic growth then it could be viewed as a crucial 
site for industrial policy, provided we conclude that a developmental 
basis for economic policy is a relevant focus.  
 
The appearance of the city as a centre of crisis may mean the 
policy for growth should be directed elsewhere, or it may mean that 
the costs imposed by an unregulated market economy 
disproportionately affects city development. Clearly history matters: 
recent history has witnessed the precipitate decline of the old 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Kurt Rothschild and Roger Sugden for significant comments and to participants at 
the European Network for Industrial Policy (EUNIP) conference, University of Florence, Prato, 
September 2007 and at seminars in the Business School and the Centre for Urban Regional 
Studies (CURS), University of Birmingham, December 2007 and February 2008. 
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industrial cities of the developed world - United States, Japan, 
Western Europe, and various countries of European settlement. It has 
also seen the emergence of large dynamic cities elsewhere in the 
developing economies, notably recently in China and India, following 
the earlier growth of the Pacific Rim countries. 
 
To understand the city and its potential requires us to go 
behind the scenes to establish the roots of dynamic economic 
performance, and precipitate decline in the early 21st century. One 
link between the old industrial world and the new which we see as 
providing a fundamental explanation, at both ends of the development 
process, is the modern transnational corporation. By switching 
investments around the world these large and powerful firms are able 
to determine the global distribution of economic activity, Dickens 
(2003). The transnationals can, at one and the same time, 
deindustrialize the older industrial countries and industrialize the 
new, within themselves. 
 
 And within themselves, only certain people matter in this 
process: the strategy within the corporation, that is the direction and 
type of development is determined by those who control the 
corporation. Who are these? The literature concludes that the major 
shareholders and the senior managers, jointly, determine strategy, for 
a recent survey of the evidence see Branston et al (2006). Others 
involved and affected by such strategy may object but ultimately they 
cannot reverse such policies. The fundamental point is that a small 
elite will dictate strategy and thus such strategy will reflect their aims 
and ambitions: the aims and ambitions of others will be neglected. 
 
 The decline of major industrial cities of the advanced world is 
related to many more or less proximate factors, in turn related to a 
changing technology of production and changes in the conditions of 
international trade, but this decline is underpinned by the strategies 
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of the major corporations, and these are in turn determined by the 
aims and ambitions of their controllers, a small minority of those 
involved with these powerful entities. Of course governments are not 
without power, but in an increasingly global world national 
governments are rendered increasingly powerless if they accept the 
rules of the game laid down by the transnationals. 
 
 It is therefore the case that strategies for development of the 
developed world - and the cities within them - have not met the aims 
and ambitions of the majority of the population within them. Such 
strategies have not been in the wider interest - the public interest, see 
for example Branston et al (2006). As a matter of history, technology 
and communications have developed to allow this global development 
of transnational companies to exploit the huge supply of labour in the 
underdeveloped world: the integration of China into the world market 
economy has almost doubled the available labour force. This has 
involved centrifugal and centripetal development: work has been put 
out from the older industrial centres to countries where labour costs 
are much lower (centrifugal), but control over such work has been 
increasingly brought to the centres of the new transnational system 
(centripetal). 
 
 And the role of the city?: as the location of rapid economic 
growth has switched so the industrial cities of the developed world 
have declined because the transnational corporations can see little 
advantage when faced with the alternative of cities elsewhere with 
significantly lower costs. Of course, if the cities of the older industrial 
world are able to establish new industries in response to this threat 
then a future can be fashioned for them in the new world. So long as 
the headquarters of the transnationals remain in the older industrial 
cities they will require services, associated with both production and 
consumption, for their future at such locations: global production 
requires management, marketing, research and development and this 
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will tend to be centralised at the headquarters site for some time, 
equally consumption out of the income generated by the corporation 
will demand local retailing, entertainment, medical and educational 
facilities. But basically opportunities will be limited and not congenial 
to the interests and abilities of larger sections of the community: those 
who work for the corporation at the centre will require specific skills 
not readily available within the labour force displaced with 
deindustrialization. 
 
 The large transnationals will have a limited loyalty to their 
origins: they will seek profits on a global basis with limited 
restrictions. Local long-term development requires a production 
system willing and able to invest in the locality in the widest sense: to 
maintain and develop the local infrastructure in terms of human 
capital, as well as physical. Transnationals will take human capital 
wherever they find it at a minimum cost and will be interested in 
government investing in it, wherever it has such influence2.  
 
The evidence suggests that large cities can maintain a long-term 
dynamism but only when they are sufficiently diversified to support 
this, Glaeser et al (1992). City decline is evident where this has not 
been maintained: Detroit and Birmingham (UK) may be cases in point, 
their precipitate decline connected with the auto industry in both 
cases, and Krasnoiarsk - 26 would be a case, perhaps more extreme, 
from a socalled planned economy3. 
 
                                                 
2 The Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (England) has produced a paper “A 
Higher Level Skills Strategy”, which sets out the case for devoting the bulk of extra university 
funding to degrees jointly designed and funded by employers, see Financial Times, February 
26th 2008,. Experience suggests that such funding will be another case of the tail wagging the 
dog, 
3 Glazyrina (2000) reports that Krasnoiarsk - 26 had a golden age from 1958 to the early 80’s 
as a centre for nuclear weapons production. It was seen as “A City of the Communist Future”, 
but “In practice the factory could not adapt to changed circumstances and operate in 
conditions of a market economy” (p200). Today it has been called “A City without a Future”, 
despite possessing “significant scientific potential”. 
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 The process of city decline can only be reversed by changing the 
industrial and organizational structure of the city. To release the city 
from the domination of the big corporations, private or public, and 
encourage the development of a more diffuse base, replacing the 
hierarchical system with a more horizontal one: City development is 
related to industrial development and industrial development is 
related to city development. Agglomeration is necessary but not 
sufficient for development, see Jacobs (1984). What is required is a 
more democratic base, where locality can be more effectively 
introduced into local strategy. We will make some proposals in line 
with this aim. Suggestions include (1) creating structures reminiscent 
of industrial districts, Becattini et al (2003), but having a coherence 
within the city; (2) creating “self-sustaining high skill ecosystems” 
based on local universities and research institutions, Finegold (1999); 
(3) creating multinational webs of cities, Cowling and Sugden (1999), 
facing similar problems, Edinburgh/Dublin; Glasgow/Hamburg; 
London/Berlin; Paris/Milan and by these various means and 
processes reshaping the economic basis of the city, from dependence 
on the strategies of the major corporations to a collective self-reliance 
of multi-national communities. 
 
The City as a Priority Focus for Industrial Policy 
 In developing the ideas in this paper I have been very much 
influenced by the much earlier writings of someone from outside 
economics, Jane Jacobs (1961, 1994, 1984). She was not taken very 
seriously by economists for many years but one central proposition of 
Jacobs has now become familiar in the theory and empirical analysis 
of economic growth, see for example Glaeser (1992). Recent work on 
economic growth sees externalities, particularly knowledge spillovers, 
as a central driver, the “engine of growth”, see Lucas (1988). Jane 
Jacobs’s inspirational writings, as viewed by this author, and many 
others, fitted in quite nicely to the new mainstream economic theories 
of the 1980’s and 1990’s, but her analysis and observations went 
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much further. She sees the city as a centre of innovation and 
experiment and ideas where small scale is seen as functional, as 
portrayed in the anarchist literature, see for example, in Woodcock 
(1975). Hers is a rejection of top-down planning, whether 
governmental or corporate: a celebration of the grass-roots, witness 
the quotation we report on page one from Jacobs (1984). Mainstream 
economics took the (or a) central idea, which it labelled dynamic 
agglomeration economies and forgot about much of the rest of the 
story. Within mainstream economics the production and use of 
knowledge is at the heart of dynamic agglomeration economies: 
external economies arise from knowledge spillovers, Romer (1986), 
Lucas (1988). And these spillovers are even more important in urban 
economies with greater physical proximity. For Jacobs (1969), the 
earliest proponent of knowledge spillovers as a central ingredient in 
economic development, diversity rather than uniformity results in new 
products and processes. Knowledge spillover is wider than the 
industry, but not as wide as the entire economy. Within this context 
she believed, and observed, that local competition fosters innovation; 
monopoly restricts. 
  
 Glaeser et al (1992) gave some validation of Jacobs’ beliefs in 
their econometric analysis of panel data for large cities, and industries 
in large cities, in the United States for the period 1956 to 1987: local 
employment growth was aided by city industrial diversity and 
competition within industries for those cities. But as we have already 
noted Jacobs extols the virtue of the city which grows and develops 
without central direction, either government or corporate: the 
successful city is an outcome of the many decisions of its population. 
Yet the reality in the case of the United States, as for other countries, 
is that cities are subject to the dominance of the big and powerful: 
therefore we have many cities in crisis, suffering the consequences of 
strategic failure. Thus cities should be seen as a priority focus for 
policy making, because of the potential rewards associated with the 
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creativity of the city which is not currently being fully realised, but 
also because of the present need of those cities in real crisis.  
 We can see the city as a lynch-pin of development. As a focus of 
new ideas springing from the intensity of interaction of people within a 
specific location: rural locations do not have the intensity and 
diversity of experience necessary for some developments. Perhaps 
surprisingly agricultural innovation was an edge of city phenomenon 
historically as Jacobs demonstrates, Jacobs (1969). It is also true that 
relatively recent major scientific developments affecting agriculture 
have been produced by state research agencies and the research arms 
of firms serving agriculture, Cowling et al (1970), Huffman and 
Everson (1993), springing from the intensity of interaction of people 
within a specific location. But this proximity should not be seen as 
purely locational, for out of that intense interaction of different 
peoples and their different ideas emerges a consensual view of ways 
forward which reflects a new mental proximity which in turn allows 
further development of mutual dependency, Sacchetti and Sugden 
(2006). This free interaction between people is a very different process 
from that of a network of direction reflecting the aims of those 
powerful groups, such as the elite at the top of corporate hierarchies, 
who seek to strategically control the process of development, Sacchetti 
and Sugden (2005). The city, when allowed to work successfully, 
provides the environment we seek for a democratic dynamism rather 
than an imposed dynamism reflecting the wishes of an elite minority.  
 
 But is the city dying?  Has the development of new technology 
allowing easy and cheap communication rendered the city obsolete? 
There are two possible effects: electronic communication substitutes 
for face to face contact and/or electronic communication complements 
face to face contacts. The first would reduce the role of the city, the 
second would enhance it. It has been found in large US cities that 
complementary is the dominant effect, Gaspar and Glaeser (1998), 
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Glaeser (1998)4. The future of the city would seem secure if this is 
indeed true. And Gaspar and Glaeser (1998) note the high level of 
agglomeration in Silicon Valley5. 
 
 Going back to Jacobs view that diversity matters for creativity 
and development it is necessary to recognise that the most recent 
empirical results do not support that view. Henderson (2003) 
estimates productivity at the plant level using urban panel data and 
finds city specialization, rather than diversity, matters. Yet knowledge 
spillovers between industries relate to new products or new varieties 
of old products. Perhaps the plant level productivity estimates of 
Henderson are not able to capture this qualitative effect. It clearly 
requires a hedonic index of productivity, which is increasingly being 
used in national productivity estimates, for example Cowling and 
Vernon (1996). 
 
 Lastly if we move briefly from the typical world of economic 
enquiry in considering the unique role of the city in innovation and 
development we might take  the case of Wittgenstein’s Vienna, see 
Janik and Toulmin (1996), who paint a fascinating picture of fin-de-
siecle Vienna. Vienna was obviously very unequal so we are not 
talking of a democratic dynamism in an inclusive sense, yet the city 
supported an intellectual ferment among an intellectual minority who 
interacted on a day-to-day basis across, as well as within, disciplines: 
philosophic, artistic, scientific, architectural,….. This is reminiscent of 
the ideas and observations which permeate Jane Jacobs work, but 
where the focus is on people at large, in the ordinary business of life 
and work. In the case of Vienna, a small fraction of society but 
                                                 
4 Some limited personal and anecdotal research reveals a possibly  interesting hypothesis: 
the first reaction of office staff was that substitution was the reality but that complementarity 
was the optimal response. This might suggest that networks of direction may move in a sub-
optimal manner in response to electronic developments - the true worth of the city may be lost 
sight of in our corporate world. 
5 Of course this observation may fit the argument of the previous footnote: it is exactly where 
we have diffuse developments like Silicon Valley that proximity is seen to be essential. 
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enormous intellectual diversity, with people meeting on a daily basis 
in the city’s coffee houses for discussion and argument.  
 But, back to earth. We are faced with cities today which have 
suffered over the past thirty or forty years from a dramatic process of 
deindustrialization and many cases of economic decline. 
 
The Jobs Gap 
The  workings of the, more or less, “free market” has left a major 
urban problem within both the US and Europe in addition to the hugh 
problems elsewhere in the developing world. As a telling example of 
the depth of the urban problem Ivan Turok and Nicola Edge (1999) 
calculated that since 1981 the 20 major cities in Britain have lost half 
a million jobs, equivalent to about 25% of their male labour force. We 
would expect Britain to be an extreme case within Europe, given that 
we are associating job loss with the “free market”, but it is clear that 
unemployment in Europe as a whole remains high and particularly so 
in large metropolitan areas. However, it is also true that the decline in 
jobs in British cities is not entirely represented in the growth of urban 
unemployment. There has been substantial growth in the 
economically inactive male population in British cities: despite having 
one of the lowest unemployment rates among the OECD countries, 
Britain also has one of the highest rate of worklessness. Currently, 
about one in six working age households have no adult in paid 
employment (Kemp et al (2004). The larger industrial conurbations in 
Britain have been the worst performers as far as the decline in 
unemployment and inactivity is concerned: Glasgow, Coventry and 
Merseyside, excluding Liverpool stand out as the worst for the 1990’s, 
wee Webster (1999). This decline in job prospects has been associated 
with lower life expectancy and an increasing gap between the 
industrial cities and less urban areas: again Glasgow shows the worst 
performance with the lowest life expectancy in Britain for both males 
and females. No industrial cities feature among the areas with highest 
life expectancy, Office of National Statistics (2004). 
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Origin of the Problems of the Cities 
There are many more or less proximate explanations for the 
problems facing European cities in recent times, but these are 
generally underpinned by their underlying economic structure, a 
structure largely created by the activities of the major corporations6. 
This has been the major theme of our work over the last twenty years 
or so, Cowling and Sugden (1994) 1998) (1999) and Sugden and 
Wilson (2002): Rothschild (2005) provides a quite succinct and up to 
date account of this new world and explains why it creates the need 
for a new approach by policymakers. 
 
In practice so called free market systems are planned through 
strategic decisions of the dominate corporations. Moreover, strategic 
decision making in these firms is in the hands of an elite. A systemic 
consequence is that free markets are plagued by strategic failure 
where these decisions necessarily prevent the attainment of socially 
desirable outcomes, prevent the achievement of the public interest. 
Thus transnational corporations, which are the generality today, 
manage trade in their own interests and “free trade” protects the 
negative freedom of these privileged elite from government intervention 
but emasculates the positive freedom of others to determine their own 
economic development. But we should not concentrate on markets. 
The subversion of decision-making within the firm in the interests of 
the few can mean that the wider interest within the city if ignored in 
strategic decisions. Thus corporations may pursue a globalisation 
strategy which may involve relocation of production from the older 
industrial cities to the newly industrialising cities of the emerging 
countries without the views of those workers in the old centres of 
production playing a role. We should not be surprised if the outcome 
is the deindustrialisation of European industrial cities with the 
inevitable consequences for jobs. Transnationals are capable of 
                                                 
6 Obviously the intensity of the problems vary across cities: some might see relatively 
prosperous cities like London or Paris or Milan as having a problem, yet closer inspection 
yields areas of relative deprivation even within a general prosperity. 
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producing pain as well as pleasure in the context of the free market, 
as it has developed. 
 
A Double Dualism 
As a rough approximation a double dualism has been created in 
the world. Within the market economy we have a core, the OECD 
countries, and periphery, the rest of the world: as Hymer (1972) put it 
we have a law of uneven development established, partly the result of 
the transnational corporations. “The tendency of the system to 
produce poverty as well as wealth, underdevelopment as well as 
development” (p114). Our point is that as well as being true at the 
global level between the developed and underdeveloped nations, the 
transnational corporations have also produced a similar gap within 
the developed world. We have undevelopment as well as development 
within the AICs and even within London and New York and Paris as 
well as within the UK and the United States and France. 
 
So within the core we have another core-periphery: “Why are we 
so rich and they so poor?” also takes on an intranational dimension, 
but also an intranational one, and perhaps increasingly so. The 
centrifugal and centripetal tendencies connected with this new 
globalism, with production leaving the old manufacturing cities of the 
core for the low wages of the periphery, and control over this process 
being concentrated within the core, provided the backdrop for the 
decaying old manufacturing cities unambiguously damaged by this 
process, with very few winners. However side-by-side them are the so 
called  command cities (or global cities, Sassen S (1991), centres of 
corporate strategic decision-making, corporate headquarters are 
concentrated in a few of the big cities of the world: New York, London, 
Tokyo, Paris have the largest concentrations7. These cities  have 
gained from centripetal developments in terms of headquarters 
                                                 
7 Sassen (2000) defines global cities as “strategic sites for the management of the global 
economy and the production of the most advanced services and financial operations” (p.21) 
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employment and employment in business services related to 
headquarters functions, but also from the employment creating effect 
of the (sometimes huge) salaries received within headquarters, which 
are spent locally on services’, medical, entertainment and such like. 
Yet the prosperity of these cities lies alongside the poverty of 
significant minorities, especially male manual workers or former 
workers, largely untouched by the wealth generated within the 
command city. We have seen the resentment built up by the 
juxtaposition of this rising local inequality, for example in the riots 
within the banlieue of Paris. 
 
A Way Forward 
It is clear that existing policies directed at the cities have been 
less than adequate. Tactical policies vary but usually involve 
alternative measures for subsidising investment by global 
corporations or for small firms. Typically corporations take the money 
and move on when it becomes attractive to do so - we have seen this 
in cities around the industrial world - and small firms have very low 
survival rates in the hostile environments created by the dominant 
corporate players - they only survive when they play to the rules set 
by the giants8. We are clearly  confronted with decaying or decayed 
manufacturing cities and decaying areas in “command” cities: but 
connected problems which we argue have their roots in strategic 
economic failures related to the dominance of major corporations in 
the market economy. At the heart of the free market systems we have 
seen systemic failures which have reduced the fundamental 
dynamism of cities. It would therefore seem essential to explore 
possibilities of creating development paths for cities which avoid such 
failures. The obvious response is to try and tackle the source of the 
failures head-on: to look at ways of involving more of those affected by 
strategic decisions in the process of making these decisions - to design 
                                                 
8 Occasionally we see small firms succeeding but they are typically acquired by their larger 
rivals and become, often uncessful, diversions of these corporate giants, see Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1989) 
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ways of democratising strategic decision making. This would be a long 
term project and highly political. In part this would need to be sought 
within the hierarchical structures of the big corporations and would 
need the monitoring of the activities of these firms. A further 
dimension of policy would be the nurturing of an alternative structure 
of production characterised by symmetrical horizontal relationships 
rather than asymmetric, hierarchical relations seen within the 
dominant mode of production today: some form of small firm 
production. Thus we would seek to convert the present essentially 
tactical approach to the problems and potential of the cities into a 
much more strategic role for economic policy aimed at restructuring 
the city economy to enable the full realization of its potential. 
 
• New Industrial Districts 
Clearly, the presence of small firms is no guarantee of socially optimal 
outcomes, nut intuitively, democratic strategic decision making 
appears more feasible if an economy comprises of smaller firms. 
Moreover it is noticeable that much recent literature has focused on 
allegedly successful groupings of small firms, especially with respect 
to innovation, in the industrial districts of Italy, see e.g. Becattini et al 
(2003). The idea of groupings of small firms is appealing because it is 
often argued that technology requires production on a large scale to 
minimise cost and it is notable that in some significant cases small 
firms have been able to cooperate to achieve these economies without 
there having to be concentration of production in one large scale 
hierarchical organisation.  
 
Yet, there has been evidence recently that some of the industrial 
districts (for example in Italy) have been experiencing real problems, 
related to globalisation and the emergence of new competition. This 
may be in line with the evidence from US cities provided by the 
econometric analysis of Glaeser et al (1992). As we have remarked 
they found evidence that city success (in terms of employment growth) 
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was linked to industrial diversity within the city,  in line with Jacobs 
(1969, 1984). In a recent debate about Jacobs on the role of the city in 
economic growth Polese (2005) argues that agglomeration is not the 
essence : but Jacobs is a richer analysis than this would suggest. 
 
Agglomeration is not sufficient for growth and development, 
diversity is necessary and this springs from a diffuse industrial base, 
which is suppressed by corporate control. Simply talking of cities as 
sites from which dynamic agglomeration economics will spring does 
not identify the essence of the problem. Growth and development 
requires a more democratic element than corporate control allows, 
witness the quote we give from Jacobs (1984) on the title page. We 
need to explain diversity and not just treat it as an independent 
variable in growth economics. It would seem that in the long-run -
Glaeser et al were looking at a 30 year period - success requires the 
stimulation of variety. Faced with repeated shocks cities need to 
change their industrial structures and a diversified industrial base 
contributes to this via the cross-fertilisation of ideas as Jacobs has 
suggested. Looking historically, for example at the industrial 
revolution in England, Jacobs saw Manchester as failing to maintain 
its success of the 19th century:  it was too specialized. She saw 
Birmingham as the city of the future with it’s more diffuse and  
diversified industrial base. Yet Birmingham has not sustained it’s 
success in the late 20th and early 21st century.  Following it’s loss of 
control over industrial development with the takeover of its industrial 
base by transnational corporations, so that strategic decision making 
has moved elsewhere: Birmingham now has the highest 
unemployment of the 8 biggest regional cities in Britain. London is 
now unique in having the diversity required for dynamism.  
 
With these sorts of observations in mind it would seem 
constructive to consider the possibility of creating city structures 
within themselves reminiscent of industrial districts, less specialised 
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in the usual sense, but having a coherence within the city, mingling 
many different aspects of the city to create new industries on which 
future development of the city might be based. This would involve 
intersecting webs of small firms, involving different lines of production 
with some elements of complementarity, for example media, IT and 
telecommunications: a large group of production units which taken 
individually are quite small but which taken as a group constitutes a 
production process on a large scale. The aim would be for units to 
cooperate by providing mutual support in a process which also 
promotes the emergence of new and rival production units: a system 
combining elements of rivalry and cooperation within it, yet constantly 
evolving. To achieve this will require policy operating with a light 
touch, eschewing monopoly positions, maintaining open access to 
knowledge and critical financial support, allowing for constant 
change. Financial support would not imply subsidy for the large and 
dominant, but credit at critical times for the evolution of the small and 
new: something like a Grameen bank tailored to the needs of the 
European city9, creating a culture where the emphasis is on people, 
individually and collectively evolving and trusting their ability to find 
many and varied development paths. 
 
 Over the long-run, the city needs to adapt and change in 
response to a multitude of shocks: a diverse industrial structure 
allows it to do this. Short-run bursts of city growth have been made in 
the past by specialized cities, but to be sustainable appears to require 
this diverse base: Jacobs was right in the long-run. The evidence 
suggests, at least for US cities, that important knowledge spillovers 
occur between industries, in the long-run at lease, rather than within 
industries. The essence of Jacobs is diversity and we must ensure 
that this is the essence of our policy. Such policies, by supporting a 
                                                 
9 It has just been reported that the Grameen Bank has just opened for business in New York, 
Financial Times February 16/17 (2008). It seems that what was designed for a very low 
income country, Bangladesh, may have relevance to the needs of small business within the 
most advanced country. 
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variety of industrial processes will also serve to support a variety of 
talents and thus avoid any tendency for people to be excluded from 
the development process. These special sorts of industrial districts 
would act as havens away from corporation dominance and 
repression, allowing experiments to take place, ideas to be hatched, 
communications between people with ideas to take place. To avoid 
decline, to promote success, a city needs continuous stimulus and 
must remain open to the entry of firms and ideas. 
 
• Self-sustaining High Skill Ecosystems  
As part of a system of new industrial districts it would be interesting 
to explore the possibilities of developing high skill ecosystems along 
the lines suggested by Finegold (1999). He bases the framework of 
such systems on successful biomedical and computer hardware and 
software firms clustered in California, and identifies four 
requirements: a catalyst, ongoing nourishment, a supportive hose and 
a high degree of interdependence among actors and suggests policy 
options for the UK. He sees the UK possessing many of the ingredients 
(universities, telecoms, science parks, culture) but some weaknesses 
(outflows of scientific stars, seed corn funds, poor links between firms 
and universities. A new technopolis in Finland, Oulo, would seem to 
have some of the necessary ingredients, Financial Times,  September 
4th 2007. Obviously creating successful high skill ecosystems will not 
solve low skill equilibrium problems of the UK, but Finegold argues 
that the policy solution is not to curtail them but rather to improve 
educational levels for those unable to benefit and to redistribute the 
wealth created to create a living wage jobs for the lower skilled in 
sheltered parts of public and private service sectors. 
 
• Multinational Webs of Cities 
To be critical of the existing transnationalism of the major 
corporations is not to advocate a narrow, national or intranational 
approach to policymaking. The development of multinational webs of 
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small firms is part of an alternative development path where people, 
and thus economies and societies, are able to realise their full 
potential (Cowling and Sugden, 1999 and Sugden and Wilson, 2002). 
Instead of internationalising production by hierarchical control and 
the concentration of decision-making, as transnational corporations 
have done, the suggestions we are making would provide an 
alternative process which would be non-hierarchical and would foster 
a diffusion of decision-making: a grass roots, multinational process of 
evolution. Many European cities are facing similar problems; 
Edinburgh/Dublin; Glasgow/Hamburg; London/Berlin; Paris/Milan; 
and similar opportunities. Cooperating on a way forward through 
small firm webs at the level of production could lead to a wider and 
deeper cooperation of societies and cultures. Such a process could 
lead to the gradual reshaping of the economic basis for the city. 
 
From Dependence to (Collective) Self-Reliance of Multinational 
Communities 
It is crucial that initiatives be pursued simultaneously at city, 
regional, national and pan-European levels. Democratic involvement 
in the economy needs to be developed at the city level but must extend 
outward to the European level otherwise actors (like the bit 
corporations) with a pan-European perspective and competence will 
undermine any local autonomy. The transnationality of the major 
corporations enables them to pit community against community in 
seeking their own ends. It is necessary to counter this power by 
creating an alternative powerbase with strong grass roots throughout 
Europe. Thus, in a long and difficult strategy, we can seek to 
transform a system of dependence into one of collective, self-reliance 
of multinational communities, “self interest as properly understood” 
through civic engagement, deToqueville, (2003). 
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